Daily Legal Current Affairs 22 May 2024, Judiciary Exam Current Affairs

Pukhraj v. State of Rajasthan

• • BENCH: Justices JB Pardiwala and Manoj Misra
  • FORUM :  Supreme Court of India

• FACTS:

• After the trial, the trial court acquitted the other two accused giving them the benefit of doubt. However, the trial court also ordered the confiscation of the vehicle.

• After the acquittal of the other two accused, the appellant came to be arrested. He was released on bail. He challenged the order of the trial court for confiscation of the vehicle on the ground that he was not heard.

• The High Court rejected his challenge.

• OBSERVATIONS

• The Supreme Court has held that an order passed under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act 1985 (NDPS Act) for the confiscation of a vehicle will be illegal if it was passed without hearing from the owner of the vehicle.

• • A case was registered against the appellant and two other accused for the offences under the NDPS Act. However, the appellant absconded and the trial was held only against the other two accused.
  • Referring to Section 63 of the NDPS Act, the Court said that an order of confiscation of an article cannot be passed until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto.
  • The bench was hearing an appeal filed against the order of the Rajasthan High Court affirming the confiscation of vehicle (a dumper) under the NDPS Act.
  • The appeal was filed by the registered owner of the vehicle. The Supreme Court set aside the direction for confiscation after noting that the owner was not heard during the proceedings.
  • The plain reading of Section 63 indicates that the court cannot order confiscation of an article until the expiry of one month from the date of seizure or without hearing any person who may claim any right thereto. It is true that at the time of the order of confiscation of the dumper, the appellant herein was not arrested. Had he been put to trial along with the other two co- accused, probably he would have submitted before the trial court why the confiscation order may not be passed.
  • The fact remains that the appellant is the registered owner of the dumper. In terms of the provisions of Section 63 of the NDPS Act, the appellant has a right to be heard by the court before the final order of confiscation is passed and the seized vehicle is put to auction.
  • The appellant was directed to file an application before the trial court for opportunity of hearing regarding the confiscation. After the application is filed, the trial court was directed to decide within a period of two weeks.

Priti Agarwalla And Others v. The State of GNCT Of Delhi And Others

• • BENCH :  Justices MM Sundresh and SVN Bhatti.
  • FORUM :  Supreme Court of India

• FACTS

• The application sought a direction for a registration of the FIR, and the same forms the basis of the present criminal appeal.
• Subsequently, the Court ordered a preliminary inquiry into the matter, and after the perusal, it dismissed the application.
• Challenging this order, an appeal was filed before the High Court. Since the same was allowed and registration of an FIR was ordered, the present appellants approached the Top Court.

• OBSERVATIONS

• The Supreme Court, while deciding a case arising out of a complaint made for an offence under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (Act), observed that an allegation of insult has to satisfy the requirement of having been made within public view. At the very outset, the Court observed that if allegations in the petition are vague and do not disclose the ingredients of an offence, registration of an FIR and investigation cannot be ordered.

• In the present case, the appellant had alleged that an offence under the Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 has been committed against him. Based on this, he filed an application under Section 156 of the CrPC before the Trial Court.

• Thereafter, the Court examined Section 3 (Punishments for offences of atrocities) of the Act.
• Section 3(1)(r) makes an intentional insult or intimidation intended to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view an offence.  The Court underscored the usage of the phrase “in any place within public view” in the Section.
• With this background in place, the Court examined the appellant's allegation and found the same, prima facie, to be ambiguous. The Court also highlighted that 'public view' means within a view of a person other than the complainant.
• “The specific allegation in the complaint on Appellant No. 2 is that Appellant No. 2 called Respondent No. 2 “chuda”, “chamar”, “chakka” and “faggot”.
• The Delhi High Court's order of filing an FIR was rendered unsustainable.  To support this, the Court had also cited a thread of precedents wherein it was well-established that, under Section 156(3) , the Magistrate does not act mechanically and rather exercises his discretion judiciously.
• There has to be an application of mind into the circumstances complained of and the offence alleged against the accused.  “From the above consideration, the available conclusion is that firstly, the Metropolitan Magistrate at the relevant point of time was justified in ordering a preliminary inquiry on the application dated 09.05.2018 and receiving the Action Taken Report from the jurisdictional police station. Further, the accusations in the complaints do not satisfy as having been made in any place within public view.,” held Justices MM Sundresh and SVN Bhatti.
• It may be noted that both parties were trainee athletes at Olympic Riding and Equestrian Academy, Eastern Jaunapur, New Delhi, a training facility for enthusiastic equestrian athletes.
• Considering a barrage of counter-allegations and the cases filed in the present matter, the Court, before parting, marked “a doubt arises whether someone who cannot calm oneself can calm and guide a horse in the horse's enthusiasm to perform each element with minimum encouragement from the rider and be an equestrian. We leave it to the passion and path of the parties.”

M/s Sundew Properties Limited v. Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission & Anr

• BENCH :  Justices Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta.
• FOrum :  Supreme Court of India
• FACTS
  • The proviso accorded upon the appellant the status of a deemed distribution licensee. Upon the Andhra Pradesh Reorganization Act, 2014 coming into force, the application was transferred to the Telangana State Electricity Regulatory Commission.
  • In 2016, TSERC accorded the status of a deemed licensee to the appellant, however, the grant was made conditional upon it satisfying the requirements of rule 3 of the Distribution of Electricity Licence (Additional Requirements of Capital Adequacy, Creditworthiness and Code of Conduct) Rules, 2005.
  • It was stated that the said compliance was mandatory as per Regulation 12 read with Regulation 49 of the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission (Distribution Licence) Regulations, 2013.  Accordingly, the appellant was directed to infuse an additional capital of Rs. 26.90 crores (30% of the total anticipated investment of Rs.89.53 crores) as equity share capital into its power distribution business.
  • Claiming that the directions of TSERC were in "excess of jurisdiction", the appellant moved an appeal before the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) under Section 125 of the Electricity Act. However, APTEL dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved, the appellant moved the Supreme Court.
  • The appellant, a 'developer' in terms of the Special Economic Zones (SEZ) Act, 2005, filed an application before the Andhra Pradesh Electricity Regulatory Commission seeking identification as a deemed distribution licensee, in terms of proviso to Section 14(b) of the Electricity Act, which was introduced vide a 2010 Notification by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry.

• ISSUES
  • After hearing the parties, the court deliberated upon and rendered decision on the following two issues:
    • Whether the designation of an entity as a SEZ developer by the MoCI ipso facto qualifies the entity to be a deemed distribution licensee, obviating the need for an application under Section 14 of the Electricity Act?
    • Whether Regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations (and by implication Rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules) is applicable to a SEZ developer recognized as a deemed distribution licensee under the proviso to Section 14(b) of the Electricity Act read with Regulation 13 of the 2013 Regulations ?

• OBSERVATIONS

• On the first aspect, the court observed that the proviso to Section 14(b) confers "deemed licensee status" on SEZ developers. However, the same does not explicitly exclude the need for obtaining a license.  "This lack of specificity, especially when compared with the clear provisions for other entities, suggests that the legislative intent was not to ipso facto grant SEZ developers the status of deemed distribution licensees, thereby obliging them to obtain a license by making an application in terms of Regulation 13 ."

• The court further opined that TSERC is empowered to scrutinize developers' applications in accordance with law, however, only limited to the provisions which are applicable to deemed licensees.

• On the second aspect, the court said that the first proviso to Section 14 does not pertain to deemed licensees and therefore the 2005 Rules did not apply to the appellant.

• "The status of a SEZ developer as a deemed licensee emanates from the 2010 Notification, which introduced the proviso to Section 14(b) , conferring deemed licensee status to SEZ developers.

• Reading anything beyond this would defeat the very purpose of the proviso and the concept of the deemed licence."  The court did not agree with TSERC on the applicability of Regulation 12 to the appellant for two reasons:
• The Electricity Act (primary legislation), through the proviso inserted in Section 14(b) , confers deemed licensee status upon SEZ developers without imposing any specific conditions.
• The 2013 Regulations make a clear distinction between an applicant seeking a license [as defined under regulation 2(d) ] and a deemed distribution licensee seeking recognition as such [as defined under regulation 2(h) ].
• Regulation 12 pertains solely to regular distribution licensees as defined under Regulation 2(h) , not to deemed licensees, the court said.  "...'Reading up' regulation 12 so as to expand its ambit to include within it deemed licensees, especially when the Electricity Act does not stipulate any such inclusion, runs counter to the subsequently inserted proviso to clause (b) of Section 14 of the Electricity Act—an exercise which is impermissible and which we cannot approve.
• Therefore, the recognition of the status of a deemed distribution licensee cannot hinge on compliance with rule 3(2) of the 2005 Rules read with regulation 12 of the 2013 Regulations."
• It was concluded that the appellant was governed by Regulation 13 , proviso to which specifically states that nothing in Regulations 4 to 11 would apply to deemed licensees.
• In view of the above, the court concluded that to obtain the status of a deemed licensee, an SEZ developer must of necessity apply in terms of the 2013 Regulations and be scrutinized.
• It was apprised that on applying in said terms, the appellant's status had been upheld. As such, the issue did not require further consideration.  Insofar as the condition imposed on the appellant regarding infusing of additional capital, the court held that the same was not justified.
• The orders of APTEL and TSERC were set aside. The order granting status of deemed distribution licensee to the appellant was modified to exclude the condition involving infusing of additional capital.

Also Check: Daily Legal Current Affairs 08 May 2024

Anju v. Home Secretary and Others

• BENCH : Justice R Sakthivel
• FORUM : Madras High court

• • PROVISION UNDER CONSIDERATION : Section 161(3) of CRPC

• FACTS OF THE CASE

• Contentions of Raja's Wife

• • • • Raja, the deceased, was illegally detained and subjected to custodial torture by the police personnel including the Sub-Inspector of Police at the Villupuram Taluk Police Station and his health deteriorated as a consequence of the injury leading to his death.
      • The family was not permitted to see Raja's body and the body was handed over in a hasty manner after the postmortem which was conducted within 30 minutes. The police had pressurized the family to cremate the body instead of burying it.

• Contentions of the Police

• • • • Raja was arrested for possessing Brandy bottles for sale without any permit or license and that he was enlarged on station bail on the same day.
      • There was not even an iota of evidence for custodial torture or harassment by the po lice and that the allegations were baseless.
      • The statements of the doctor prove that Raja's body did not have any external injuries.
      • If there were external injuries, the family would have raised objections then itself which was not done.

• Family's Demand

• • • • The family of the deceased Raja had approached the court seeking directions to the authorities to exhume the body and conduct a re-postmortem adhering to the norms.
      • The family had also sought a copy of the post-mortem certificate along with videographs of the postmortem.

• COURT'S OBSERVATION

• • The Court ordered the Villupuram District Collector to exhume the dead body of a man after his family approached the court alleging that the man had died as a result of custodial torture.
  • Actions of the police personnel created a serious suspicion around the death of the man and thus the family's suspicion couldn't be brushed aside.
  • An enquiry would be necessary to unearth the truth and noting that the same should not cause any prejudice to the authorities, the court directed the exhumation of the body and ordered re-postmortem.
  • The court noted that although the statements of three doctors were taken under Section 161(3) of the CrPC, these statements were not despatched to the Jurisdictional Magistrate till date which created a cloud over the authority's case.
  • The court also noted that Raja was released on station bail as he was feeling unwell and fizzy as per the Prisoner's Search Register.
  • The court observed that if Raja was not feeling well while he was in the custody of the police, the police ought to have taken him to the hospital which was not done.
  • An inquiry under Section 176 of CrPC was essential to unearth the truth, the court directed the authorities to exhume the body and conduct a re-postmortem with a team of two Doctors having Master's Degrees in Forensic Medicine, one from Madras Medical College and one from KAP Vishwanathan Government Medical College, Trichy.
  • The court also directed the authorities to follow the guidelines laid down by the court scrupulously.

Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited v. Baby Forest Ayurveda Private Limited (Formerly Known As M/S Landsmill Healthcare Private Limited) & Ors.

• BENCH : Justice Anish Dayal
• FORUM : Delhi High Court

• FACTS OF THE CASE

• • • The suit was filed by Mountain Valley Springs India Private Limited, the company which owns Forest Essentials.
    • It sought to restrain the defendants from using the marks- 'BABY FOREST', 'BABY FOREST–SOHAM OF AYURVEDA', 'BABY ESSENTIALS' and 'SAUNDARYA POTLI'.

• COURT'S OBSERVATION

• • The Delhi High Court has dismissed the interim injunction plea filed by skincare and cosmetics brand Forest Essentials seeking to restrain another brand from using the marks “Baby Forest” and “Baby Forest- Soham of Ayurveda” while selling baby care products.
  • The word 'Forest' in itself is generic and Forest Essentials cannot claim dominance over the said part of their trademark, having not sought registration under Section 17 (2) of the Trademark Act.
  • For plaintiff to claim monopoly over the mark 'FOREST', which is itself a commonly used word, therefore may not be tenable.
  • The undertaking by the defendant company Baby Forest to not use the marks 'SAUNDARYA' and 'BABY ESSENTIALS, will continue to subsist.
  • The fact that Forest Essentials has sold products worth Rs. 15 crores as opposed to defendants' Rs. 2.26 crores did not give them a right to appropriate any mark related to the word 'FOREST', or to displace a registered mark 'BABY FOREST', without having a registration themselves in 'FOREST ESSENTIAL BABY' and 'FOREST ESSENTIALS-BABY ESSENTIALS'.
  • A couple of social media references are not enough to show that there is 'widespread confusion' or likelihood thereof. There is no substantial evidence to show continued confusion amongst customers over a length of time,” the court said.
  • The new digital revolution in retail is obvious, and does not need to be articulated, since it envelops and involves most consumers, at least in the urban and semi-urban areas.
  • With approximately 450 million smartphone users in India, the ability to access information is very high and prevalent, and while understanding the mindset of the consumer, this must be brought into consideration.